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Based on an interactionist approach, this article examines how men workers negotiate doing of 
factory jobs conventionally considered suitable for young women, and how they defend their 
masculinity in harsh and contested organizational environments. Data collected during a 15-
month long ethnography of a large global factory in South China reveal that in an oppressive 
institutional setting that involves coercive management, devaluation of men labor, and the lack 
of a family wage, men workers defend their masculinity through offensive language, flirting and 
sexual harassment, as well as physical violence. In doing so, they develop a rebellious identity, 
diaomao, both to address themselves and to curse others, as a way to resist their low status, 
reconstruct their own understanding of the power hierarchy, and consequently, defend their 
deprived masculinities. This article asserts the critical role of daily interpersonal interaction in 
gender practices and in labor process. 
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Introduction 
      The role of gender in labor control practices has long been acknowledged by labor studies 
scholars. Young women workers, considered to be inexpensive, docile and dexterous, are ideal 
because they reduce labor costs at both the global and local levels (Cavendish 1982; Mies 1998, 
114-17; Salzinger 2003, 9-10). This tendency to hire young women started to take place in China 
during the first decades of its reform when a massive number of young, single, rural women were 
just as keen to work in coastal factories as the employers were to hire them (Lee 1998, 70; Pun 
2005, 49, 54). Gender and femininity formed the basis of the regimes of workplace control and 
played a central role in the accumulation of global capital in China (e. g. Lee 1998, 160-62; Pun 
2005, 143-44; Hanser 2008, 17-18; Yan 2008).  
      However, the increasing demand for young women workers has in turn caused a shortage. 
For example, the shortage of women labor in the Guangdong province alone was 1,398,600 
individuals in 2007.1 In view of this labor shortage, global factories, which are owned by 
transnational corporations and mainly produce goods for the world market, have resorted to 
recruiting young men for assembly line jobs that were previously occupied by women.2 In the 
electronic manufacturing industry in China, the percentage of men employees has increased from 
42% in 2004 to 53.9% in 2012.3 As a result, men have recently replaced women as the dominant 
gender in many global factories in China. Consequently, the recent predominance of men 
workers has transformed gender practices, discourses, and the labor process on the shop floor. 
1Source: Department of Labor and Social Security of Guangdong Province. 2007. “Guangdong Sheng Laodongli 
Shichang Gongqiu Zhuangkuang Fenxi" (A Report on the Supply and Demand in the Labor Market in Guangdong). 
2Salzinger (1997) discussed a similar situation in her study where the high demand for women workers led to the 
difficulty of attracting sufficient numbers of young women to work in export-processing factories on Mexico’s 
northern border.  
3 Source: Chinese Labor Statistic Yearbook, 2005, 2013.  
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Slovcoon Technology Company,4 one of the largest electronics manufacturing services 
providers in the world, offers assembly and engineering services to top global brands. Slovcoon 
established its first factory in Mainland China in the 1980s. Today, it has dozens of production 
facilities across different regions in China, employing over one million people (Slovcoon 
Technology Company, 2015). Due to the shortage of women workers in the labor market since 
the mid-2000s, Slovcoon has resorted to employing a large number of men on the assembly line. 
Since 2008, the number of men workers has gradually surpassed the number of women and, as of 
2014, men comprise 64.5% of the total workforce (Slovcoon Technology Company, 2015, 26). 
        To safeguard productivity, Slovcoon management has established a strict and formal 
organizational hierarchy. The company uses coercive control to ensure the absolute obedience of 
subordinates to their superiors. Under these arrangements, many men workers on the production 
line find themselves at the very lowest level of the company hierarchy. Also, the standardized 
operation procedures and lack of a family wage mean that the conventional expectations of 
masculinity, such as autonomy and the ability to support a family, cannot be fulfilled at the 
workplace. Thus, the strict hierarchy and coercive control in these sorts of factories render them 
an oppressive environment for men workers to perform masculinity.  
Contrary to numerous studies that have focused on men who do the jobs of women in the 
Western context and face the challenge of doing masculinity in “contested” or “embattled” 
environments (Williams 1995; Lupton 2000; Dellinger 2004), Chinese men workers are facing 
greater challenges because gender relations and identity are mediated by the class relations of 
global capitalist production, which is highly exploitative. Their unique challenges include the 
absence of upward mobility, daily verbal and physical abuse, and lack of a family wage. 
Therefore, we use the term “deprived masculinity” to describe these unique challenges faced by 
4 All names, including company, location, and people, are pseudonyms.  
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Chinese men workers, and to capture the situation in which they are deprived of both masculine 
privileges, such as being superior to women, and resources to rely on for sustaining masculinities.  
        Partly due to the deteriorating work conditions of these factories as publicized by the media, 
there has recently been burgeoning literature on Chinese migrant workers. Most studies have 
been concerned with labor rights, management style and working conditions (Pun et al. 2012; 
Pun and Chan 2012, 2013; Pun and Xu 2012). Others have focused on the differences between 
the first and second-generations of migrant workers (e.g. Pun and Chan 2013; Smith and Chan 
2015). Although these studies have provided valuable insights into the management style and 
living conditions, none have examined the subjective experiences of men workers in a job 
environment where their masculinity is challenged.  
        Based on a 15-month ethnographic study in one of the largest global factories, this article 
examines how young men workers employed in factory jobs that are conventionally considered 
appropriate for young women situate themselves and defend their masculinity in the absence of 
institutional support. Unlike most analyses of labor processes that focus on institutional and 
cultural factors (Lee 1998; Pun 2005), this study focuses on the micro-sociological approach to 
the interaction order (Goffman 1983; Fine and Fields 2008). The interactionist approach helps us 
understand how men workers maintain and construct their masculinity in a highly coercive and 
exploitative global factory. In particular, we investigate how men workers engage in 
compensatory manhood acts when they are deprived of the usual benefits afforded to them in a 
patriarchal society, and when they fail to meet the social expectations associated with a 
masculine identity such as authority and autonomy. Even under disparaging conditions, these 
men workers defend their masculinity through daily on-the-ground interactions. Without 
  4 
institutional support, they have rebuilt their masculinity through the use of offensive language, 
sexual harassment, and even physical violence.  
 Below we first review the relevant literature on gender and work, especially those that 
examine how men reconstruct their masculinity when entering traditionally women-dominated 
jobs in Western contexts. We compare this situation faced by men in Western contexts with that 
of Chinese men workers. Then, we present the methods of data collection. After an overview of 
Slovcoon and its organizational structure, we provide an ethnographic account of how the men 
workers deal with the crisis of deprived masculinity. Lastly, we analyze how they engage in 
resistant actions and redefine the power dynamics within the rigid and formal organizational 
hierarchy, thereby maintaining their masculinity through daily face-to-face interactions.  
 
The Advantages of an Interactionist Approach to Doing Masculinity at Work 
       Gender identity, such as femininity or masculinity, is not an essential entity because it is 
constituted through the repetition of gender performances (West and Zimmerman 1987; 
Williams 1995; Bird 1996). As suggested by Butler, individuals repeatedly perform their gender 
identities in accordance with gender norms (rules or ideas of how men and women should look 
or act in the social discourse) (Butler 1990, 25). 
Since gender identities are constituted by repeated acts and practices, this article adopts an 
interactionist approach by asserting the practical nature of gender identities. Under this view, 
gender identity is both a goal that workers aim to achieve and a tool for them to draw on when 
negotiating their position in the factory. This approach underscores how imperative daily face-to-
face interactions are for workers trying to sustain their masculinity in harsh and contested 
environments. 
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 Performing Gender on the Shop Floor of Global Factories 
Most of the existing work on gender and globalization has focused on women, which is not 
surprising given that women’s labor has been a resource for global capitalism (Acker 2004). 
Studies have revealed that women workers in underdeveloped countries are desirable workers for 
the assembly lines of transnational corporations because they are regarded as docile, inexpensive, 
and able to tolerate repetitive, low skilled and low paid work. However, the opposite is true for 
men, who “…have been redefined as less desirable workers—lazy, demanding, and unreliable” 
(Salzinger 1997, 549).  
Since the early decades of reform in China, industrial production for the world market has 
mostly been carried out by migrant women workers from rural areas. Because they are hired and 
believed to be best at the “lowest” form of work (the repetitive, “easy” assembly line jobs), the 
gender hierarchy on the shop floor is clear: women constitute the lower ranking assembly 
workers, while most managerial positions are reserved for men. Moreover, men in managerial 
positions use patriarchal discourses to define young women workers as “maiden workers” 
(dagongmei) to legitimize their biased division of labor (Lee 1998, 124). The term dagongmei 
insinuates that women workers are domestic-oriented laborers who are waiting to be married off; 
they are deemed unreliable and undeserving of promotion. The use of the term dagongmei by the 
management staff clearly exemplifies a point made by Pun (2005, 142-145) that the regulating of 
the gender identity of women workers is a key disciplining and self-disciplining technique to 
make them more exploitable because they are constantly reminded of their femaleness, which 
entails submissiveness and obedience to management.  
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      However, both Lee (1998) and Pun (2005) agree that women workers are not passive objects 
of patriarchal and capitalist ideologies. Women workers may subscribe to the identity of 
dagongmei, but they assign new meanings to this identity. Working in the city gives them the 
opportunity to develop their skills and broaden their horizon to create a relatively independent 
womanhood in marriage and family. In this way, women workers actively engage in defining 
their identities and constituting their interests (Lee 1998, 80-82). Moreover, through gossip, 
jokes, and fighting, the women who subscribe to this dagongmei identity can disrupt the 
dominating gender discourse, resist the disciplinary machine, and struggle to return to being 
social actors (Pun 2005).  
As these studies show, individuals have the capacity and autonomy to take up, abandon, and 
re-build gender identities through each act in order to contest and re-shape regulatory gender 
discourses. While the relationship between femininity and labor processes has been well-studied, 
little work has been done on how highly exploitative global capital influences working-class 
masculinity in China. However, now that factories have to hire men to work on the shop floor, 
men workers need to address the corporation’s perception of them as being less suitable for the 
job. To better understand this phenomenon, we first look at masculinity and work in Western 
contexts in which men are doing women’s jobs but facing different institutional settings, i.e. 
without the institutional deprivation of human dignity or family wage.   
 
Gender, Masculinity and Work 
As an “aspect of identity formation” (Kerfoot and Whitehead 1998, 440), masculinities are 
defined as “configurations of practice within gender relations, a structure that includes large-
scale institutions and economic relations as well as face-to-face relationships and sexuality” 
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(Connell 2000, 29). Therefore, the key to sustaining and reproducing masculinities is through 
constant practices in daily routines, including both work relations and interpersonal interactions 
(Martin 2003, 353). 
Based largely on practices from the global North (Western modern culture), Connell notes 
four kinds of masculinities: hegemonic, subordinate, complicit and marginalized (1995, 76-81).5 
Even though it is expressed by few men, hegemonic masculinity dominates because most men 
(even subordinated ones) support it; hegemonic masculinity enables them to reproduce the 
existing relations of male supremacy, or domination of men over women.6 In this way, men can 
agree on the existing gender order and maintain its reproduction (Kerfoot and Whitehead 1998; 
Whitehead 1999; Acker 2004). 
Work organizations are key venues for constructing, routinely practicing, refining and 
testing hegemonic masculinity (e.g., Connell 1987; Kerfoot and Knights 1993; Williams 1995; 
Martin 2001). Indeed, ideologies and discourses of gender play a central role in maintaining and 
reproducing sexual segregation and sexual division of labor (Pierce 1995; Simpson 2004). The 
organizational context and workplace culture lead to different masculine performances, and 
consequently, construct specific versions of masculinities (Morgan 1992; Dellinger 2004). 
 
Men Doing Women’s Work in Western Contexts 
5 Connell’s four types of masculinities differ from deprived masculinity in the sense that none of them describe the situation 
faced by Chinese men workers who are facing institutional deprivations. Let’s take “subordinate masculinity” as an example. 
According to Connell, it mainly means the subordination of homosexual masculinity to heterosexual masculinity. But in the 
Chinese case, the low status of these men workers is caused by the exploitative capitalism and organizational structure in the 
factory, rather than “homosexuality” or other forms of marginalized masculinity. The harsh situations faced by Chinese men 
workers rarely exist in the Western context, where labor rights and basic human rights are to a certain degree protected.  
 
6 See also Schwalbe (1992). 
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   Men construct masculinities differently depending on whether the context is considered to 
be safe or embattled; that is, whether the workplace culture supports or challenges the elements 
of dominant masculinity (Dellinger 2004). When challenged, men tend to perform “protest 
masculinity” (Connell 1995, 109-12; 2000). One place to examine how men perform masculinity 
in an embattled context is when they enter workplaces that are traditionally women-dominated.  
Since the mid-1980s, much work has been done on men who work in women-dominated 
occupations such as nurse practitioners, librarians and elementary school teachers (Robinson & 
Hockey 2011). Extant studies have found that in occupations traditionally seen as women’s work 
men benefit from their minority status, such as being more likely to have upward mobility than 
their women colleagues (Williams 1989, 1995; Pierce 1995; Robinson & Hockey 2011). 
Williams (1995, 87) calls this phenomenon the “glass escalator.” 
However, the predominance of hegemonic masculinity means that when men enter 
occupational sectors that are traditionally populated by women, their masculinity is challenged. 
Rather than abandoning their gender identity, they still try to play up their masculinity (Williams 
1995; Lupton 2000) by utilizing various strategies to confront the challenges such as 
emphasizing the masculine components of their jobs (Williams 1995, 17-18, 141), prioritizing 
their future career prospects rather than the job (Lupton 2000), aligning themselves with other 
more powerful male groups (Floge and Merrill 1986; Martin 2001), and distancing themselves 
from women (Williams 1993, 3; Lupton 2000). 
Existing studies have identified that interpersonal interactions are very important in the 
process of reconstructing masculinities. “Impression management” strategies (Thompson and 
McHugh 1990, 343-46), such as dress (Collier 1998), are important ways that men reinforce their 
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masculinity when working with women. Some men even proceed to do the job differently such 
as refusing to defer when necessary (Williams 1995; Lupton 2000).  
 In addition to performing gender norms, there are other factors that influence the social 
construction of masculinities and masculinity practices such as race and class. Despite the 
prevalence of the “glass escalator” phenomena (Williams 1995; Lupton 2000; Simpson 2004), 
some studies found that not all men who do “women’s work” can equally ride the “glass 
escalator” (Henson and Rogers 2001). Black men nurses, for example, do not benefit from their 
“token status” in the same way as white men who can advance in the women-dominated sector of 
nursing (Wingfield 2009). Consequently, men who try to reconstruct their masculinities engage 
in collaborative performances when conversing with other men to reinforce their hegemonic 
masculinity and domination over women.  
Masculinity is also expressed differently by different classes (Collinson 1992, 77). Studies 
on working-class men have shown that hard labor in factories proves male toughness (Willis 
1977; Donaldson 1991). Yet, in modern automated production processes, working-class 
masculinity is constantly undermined by low pay and alienated work that induce and reinforce 
feelings of stupidity, ignorance and powerlessness. Therefore, as Donaldson (1991, 20-24) 
argues, working-class men obtain confidence, meaning and respect in family life. Home is where 
they could repair and sustain their undermined masculinity. 
Across many societies, masculinity is tightly linked to the role of the breadwinner 
(Livingstone and Luxton 1989; Donaldson 1991). The ability to bring home a living or family 
wage affirms manhood and the structure of patriarchy (Livingstone and Luxton 1989). Men who 
cannot support their families consider themselves failures (Kleinberg 1979). Similarly, in China 
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today, when market values penetrate all realms of social life, masculinity is largely related to 
salary, possessions, and the ability to provide respectable living conditions for the family. 
However, most Chinese migrant workers, especially those in electronic factories, are young 
single men, far from home, and cannot earn a family wage.  
       In this paper we examine how Chinese men workers rescue their deprived masculinity by 
engaging in confrontational activities. Our argument is that the young men workers defend their 
masculine identities through daily interactions with fellow workers and the line supervisors, who 
are the lowest level of management. In particular, they defend their masculinity by constructing a 
rebellious diaomao identity through offensive language, flirting with women workers, and even 
sexual harassment and physical violence. While engaging in conflicts or flirting, they evoke 
alternative discourses that the Slovcoon management downplays, such as gender and class, 
redefining the power hierarchy on the shop floor. For example, they use gender discourse to take 
advantage of women workers and supervisors, and equate themselves with the line supervisors 
by emphasizing the common class status of migrant workers.  
 
Methods and Data 
      Our data were mainly collected from 15 months of ethnographic research in D city located in 
South China. As the borderland of global capitalism, D city has experienced substantial 
economic growth and attracted millions of migrant workers from inland provinces such as Hunan, 
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Hubei and Sichuan since 1980. There were 6.13 million migrant workers in D city at the end of 
2011, accounting for 80.1% of the total workforce, of which, men workers constituted 58.1%.7 
  From 14 November to 18 December 2011, the second author worked as an assembly line 
worker in the Longflower Factory of Slovcoon. The Longflower Factory is infamous for its strict 
and heavy-handed entrance control as those not employed by Slovcoon are not permitted to enter 
the workplace. Therefore, the researcher concealed her identity and applied for work in this 
factory, ultimately being hired to the assembly line. Although she concealed her identity to 
access Slovcoon, she identified herself as a researcher to her co-workers on the production line. 
After she clearly explained the purposes of the study, they agreed to keep her “secret” from their 
line supervisors and other managerial staff.  
At her location, men comprised more than 70% of the workforce. Among the 1,920 night 
shift workers, there were 1,511 men and only 409 women. She worked and ate as an ordinary 
worker with other workers. Her task was to assemble e-book readers for a well-established 
American brand. While employed, she worked a total of 336 hours on the assembly line. As a 
woman on the assembly line, the second author empathized with the feelings and experiences of 
her coworkers such as feeling exhausted after a long day or humiliation and anger after being 
reprimanded by the line-supervisors. She lived in a Slovcoon dormitory, sharing a room with 
seven others, and visited workers in the same dormitory building. Before given a day off, the 
second author was required to work 12-hour shifts for 13 consecutive days. Due to the long work 
hours, most workers were too tired to engage in long conversations after work. As a result, most 
of time, the second author recorded her feelings, experiences, observations and conversations 
7D City Investigation Team, National Bureau of Statistics of the People’s Republic of China. 2014. “Xiandai Hua Jiegou 
Zhuanxing de Jiannan Jincheng" (The Difficult Process of Organizational Modernization Transformation). 
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with her coworkers at the end of the workday, and most of the interviews were conducted after 
she left the factory and moved to the Greenwood community.  
 The Greenwood community is located in the vicinity of the Longflower Factory, and the 
second author resided there for over 14 months (from January to April and August to November 
in 2012, and then February to July in 2013). Greenwood is a compound community consisting of 
Slovcoon dormitories, rental rooms, and entertainment facilities such as a shopping mall and 
restaurants. Thousands of Slovcoon workers reside in the factory dormitories in Greenwood, and 
many married or cohabitating couples rent rooms. By visiting the Slovcoon workers in their 
homes, and frequenting the karaoke bar and shopping mall with them, she befriended many 
Slovcoon workers, and observed their daily lives outside the workplace. 
Informal interviews were also conducted throughout the field observation, while 59 semi-
structured in-depth interviews were implemented with workers and line supervisors that spanned 
30 minutes to three hours. The interviewees included 44 men and 15 women employees who 
were chosen due to their differences in age, education background, marital and relationship 
statuses, and ranks in the factory. All 59 interviewees were informed of the identity of the 
researcher and then granted permission to be questioned. 
Data collection generated over 350 pages of field notes (in Chinese), which, together with 
interview transcripts, were double-blind coded by both authors. The main coding schemes 
include the organization structure, the workers’ daily routines, the workers’ responses, and 
consequences on their daily life, behavior, and attitudes. The main theme of the paper (men 
workers resort to interpersonal confrontations to defend their deprived masculinities) emerges 
from the discussions between the two authors based on the field notes and interview transcripts.  
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  The second author also took part in a Slovcoon study group of 60 scholars and students 
from 20 universities in Mainland China, Hong Kong and Taiwan. In 2010 and 2011, this research 
team collected more than 2,100 questionnaires (hereafter called the Survey) and interviewed 400 
Slovcoon workers in different cities such as Tianjin, Shanghai, and Zhengzhou. Both authors 
analyzed the Survey and interview transcripts of other locations independently and then 
compared notes and conclusions. A comparison between this research on the Slovcoon workers 
in D city and other locations showed that many of the findings in this work in general apply to all 
Slovcoon factories. In particular, analyses of the Survey data indicate that the phenomena 
observed in this particular factory, as such the diaomao identity, are pervasive among the 
majority of Slovcoon men workers.  
 
Oppressive Institutional Arrangements for Performing Masculinity 
        Although men have replaced women as the majority on the factory line, the work in 
Slovcoon has not been restructured to be independent, autonomous and well paid. The men 
workers face different expectations than those by the women workers. Consequently, there are 
many limitations in maintaining masculinity, which are discussed as the oppressive institutional 
conditions for doing masculinity in the factory, as follows.  
 
Organizational Hierarchy and Coercive Management 
The most obvious distinction at the factory is not gender but rather rank and position. All 
workers wear uniforms that designate the different ranks. Ordinary workers wear white coveralls, 
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while line and group supervisors, a blue vest. Technicians wear blue coats, while quality 
controllers—women and men alike—wear pink shirts and caps.  
      This dress code directly reflects Slovcoon’s “semi-militant management” strategy, a style 
based on dictatorial control and unquestioning obedience of the hierarchical order. There are 12 
employee ranks, from ordinary worker to the general manager. In the assembly line, “ordinary 
workers” (pugong) are the lowest rank. The workers point out that in this hierarchical system, the 
upper ranks have absolute power and control over the lower ranks, while the lower ranks must 
take orders and execute commands from the upper ranks without questioning. The rigidity of the 
hierarchy was repeatedly emphasized by workers during interviews.  
      In this hierarchy, the power and status of the actors are strictly defined by the formal roles 
assigned to them by the factory. Factors external to the worker-supervisor interactions, such as 
gender, age, education, and class, are replaced by the hierarchy, which is defined by the factory 
itself. For example, the uniforms are gender neutral, hiding their gendered bodies and caps cover 
every strand of hair. Therefore, in contrast to men employees in Western contexts who can 
express their gender through dress and hairstyle (Robinson & Hockey 2011, 24), this is not the 
case for these workers. 
        To ensure obedience to the hierarchical order, Slovcoon employs coercive management, 
which is best exemplified by its heavy use of security. An estimated 1,000 security guards are 
hired for the Slovcoon Longflower factory (Dean 2007). Equipped with batons on their belts, 
security guards are responsible for keeping internal order and maintaining discipline. They check 
workers by using metal detectors when they need to leave the production line to use the 
washroom, eat, drink, or at the end of the shift. If the metal detector is set off, the workers are 
body searched by the guards.  
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        Coercive management is also reflected in the language and practices of the supervisors. 
Superiors verbally abuse and physically punish workers to reduce their self-esteem, convincing 
them of their low status. Roy (1959) discusses how the informal interaction among workers on 
the line, such as sharing food and drink, lead to job satisfaction. However, the prevailing 
condition in Roy’s case is the laissez-faire management at the workplace (166). This is in sharp 
contrast to the conditions faced by Chinese workers, who are not allowed to engage in any 
activities other than working. For example, workers must apply for an off-duty permit to drink 
water or visit the washroom, and workers are not allowed to talk or walk around their station. 
When rules are violated, workers face verbal and physical abuse. A worker said: “I think that 
Slovcoon treats us like slaves. Management yells whenever they like, and we just suffer 
silently.” According to the Survey, in 2010, 16.4% of workers have experienced physical 
punishment by management or security guards, and 54.6% feel unsatisfied or angry about factory 
regulations and management. 
The coercive management style, especially the constant verbal and physical abuse, means 
that the conditions that these Chinese workers face are much more challenging than those of men 
performing women’s jobs in the Western context. Here, the masculinities of the Chinese men 
workers are not only challenged by working with women, but also by losing their basic human 
dignity through public reprimanding.  
 Moreover, most of the men workers lack a sense of confidence or control, much like 
factory workers in other contexts who operate within a rigid division of labor and perform highly 
repetitive tasks. For example, most line workers referred to themselves as parts of a “machine” 
on the production line. One worker, a 20 year-old man whose job is to place four tiny screws 
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onto mobile phones, expressed: “Every day I have to do the same thing…thousands of 
times…drives me nuts, but I have no choice.”  
Another men worker indicated that the hardest part of his job is to suffer the verbal abuse 
and punishment from his supervisors on the shop floor. 
I’m not afraid of…hard work, but…being scolded every day...is very stressful. Sometimes 
they [supervisors]…threaten to punish me...We are treated like children… over 20 years old, 
but still get yelled at every day. 
Their sense of independence, pride, and self-esteem, which is a fundamental part of masculinity, 
has been eroded by the highly repetitive and low-skilled work. While management can develop 
and reinforce masculinity by controlling others, working-class men under management’s control 
find their masculinity constantly questioned, undermined, and degraded. The quasi-military type 
of management style, characterized by strict discipline and despotic punishment, reinforces 
feelings of powerlessness, alienation, and degradation in the men workers.  
 
Devaluation of Men Labor 
       Not only are men pugong at the bottom of the ladder, they are considered by management to 
be inferior to the women workers of the same rank. From the management’s perspective, women 
workers outperform the men workers in many respects. For example, the women tend to have 
higher production output. If a woman worker has low output, the line supervisors and technicians 
would say to her: “The guys can make 200 an hour. But you’re a woman, so how come you can’t 
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even do as well as the guys?” The implication is that the women should not even compare 
themselves to the men workers since the men are less desirable workers.  
In addition to being less desirable, men workers are treated poorly by the management staff. 
According to the Survey, men workers are more likely to be scolded or physically punished by 
managerial staff than women workers, who are given an oral warning. Not surprisingly, the 
percentages of men workers who felt angry, unsatisfied, and desperate are also higher than 
women workers.  
       Men know that they are considered less qualified than women. Faced with such prejudice, 
they do not work faster or compare themselves to women workers; instead, they are more likely 
to loaf on the job by visiting the washroom or dozing off. Some even try to persuade the women 
workers to reduce their pace. For example, a man worker once said to Fang, a woman worker, 
with sarcasm: “Why are you working so fast? Are you trying to get your handsome brother [the 
man line supervisor] to praise you?” Other men workers resorted to rudeness and yelled at the 
women workers: “Fuck! What’s wrong with you?! Why are you working so fast?” Others tried to 
reason with the women: “Slow down. Slovcoon will not give you more money for working 
harder.” In contrast to Mexican men who assert their masculinity by disparaging the ability of the 
women to do the work at all (Salzinger 1997, 561-562), these Chinese men workers mock their 
women peers for being docile and “ideal” workers.   
 
Lack of Family Wage 
Since providing a family wage is essential for masculine identity, men workers on the 
production line report not being fulfilled because their wages cannot support a family in the 
  18 
future. The low salaries at Slovcoon are far from being a “family wage.” The average monthly 
earnings of Slovcoon workers in 2010 were 1723 RMB (about 278 USD) (Pan et al. 2012, 253). 
Such a meager salary can only provide the basics for day-to-day necessities in a large city like D 
city, and nothing more, as exemplified by a popular saying among the workers: “working in 
Slovcoon, you’ll never have a wife, and even the occasional prostitute can give you financial 
problems.” In contrast, women workers do not face the burden of securing family wage 
employment because the societal expectation is for them to return to their hometown for 
marriage and childrearing.  
       A small percentage of men workers are married, and their marriage and family life practices 
are significantly influenced by their semi-proletarian status in China (Pun and Ren 2008), 
meaning they have lost most of their patriarchal dividend. Meager wages have inhibited the 
settlement of migrant workers in urban communities and cohabitation with their spouse. Thus, it 
is normal that a couple would work in two factories or even in two cities, while their child (or 
children) is raised by grandparents back in their rural hometown. This segregated family life 
destabilizes the family’s structure and relationships. Some of the married men workers expressed 
frustration and low self-esteem at their inability to support their family:  
My son is now school age, but I don’t have the ability to send him to school. I feel so 
embarrassed. This is so frustrating! To be honest, if I can’t pay for my son’s tuition...I 
really want to die. (Married man worker, father) 
This father-son relationship—a fundamental component of patriarchal family relations—is 
damaged and undermined due to the lack of a family wage. Their inability to earn a “decent” or 
“living” wage—the material base of familial patriarchy—means that their patriarchal dividend 
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can be challenged and undermined within the family. They are also unable to remedy their 
undermined masculinity with family life, as discussed in the literature (Donaldson 1991, 99). 
       In sum, the men workers at the Slovcoon factory are placed in an environment that oppresses 
their gender identity. Facing these conditions, the Chinese men workers are different from men 
who are doing the jobs of women in Western contexts. First, there is no “glass escalator” because 
they will not be promoted. In fact, they are considered less desirable than women workers and 
even less likely to be promoted; as such, the majority of line supervisors are women who have 
been promoted from the position of pugong. Second, in addition to the usual challenges to their 
masculinities because they work with women, these men workers endure daily verbal and 
physical abuse from management. This coercive environment provides them with little to 
reconstruct their undermined masculinity. Third, unlike men workers in the West who can earn a 
decent salary to support themselves or raise a family, these men workers do not earn enough to 
support a family and are unable to live with their wife and children. Family life, the one area in 
which undermined masculinity can be remedied, is not available to these Chinese men workers.  
       Yet they still try to defend their masculinity. Although there is little that they can do to seek 
upward mobility, they defend their masculinity through confrontational practices characterized 
by using offensive language to undermine the authority of management and to redefine the 
power order on the shop floor, flirting with and sexual harassment of women workers, and 
physical violence. All of these acts of resistance lie in interpersonal interactions.8 
 
Performing Masculinity and Negotiating Power Dynamics on the Shop Floor 
8 Don Roy (1954) made similar observations in that workers turn to informal interactions at the workplace to resist 
strict labor controls. However, Roy (1954) focused more on the cooperation between different sub-groups among the 
workers. Here we focus on how the Chinese men workers interact with other workers and their supervisors on the 
same line or workshop.  
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        To deal with their inferior status, the men workers actively constructed a masculine identity 
of diaomao. Diaomao is the most popular identity shared by all men workers across the 
Slovcoon factories in other cities.9 Here, “diao” means the male genitalia in Chinese, and “mao” 
refers to hair, so the term literally means male pubic hair. Diaomao constitutes an identity 
because the men workers call themselves and each other diaomao in many different and 
conflicted situations. On most occasions, diaomao refers to any man worker in Slovcoon. These 
men show their intimacy and comradery by stating that “we are all diaomao.” Yet, diaomao can 
also be used to remind others of their low-status, causing quarrels and even fights among the 
men workers.  
A term created and widely used by all Slovcoon men workers and only by Slovcoon men 
workers, diaomao denotes an identity that is rebellious in nature. Compared to “diaosi,” a 
popular self-depreciating and self-mocking identity bred online (Szablewicz 2014; Yang, Tang, 
and Wang 2014), diaomao is a working-class identity rooted from the “diaoren” (scolding 
people) management style at Slovcoon and the daily experiences of “aidiao” (being scolded). A 
diaomao uses obscenities and sometimes acts like a hooligan. As diaomao, the men workers 
emphasize that they are constantly challenging management. The collective identity of diaomao 
builds on a working-class masculine solidarity because it separates them from women, who do 
not share the identity of diaomao. Moreover, the making of the masculine diaomao identity aids 
in negotiating power to gain superiority over the women workers and to resist the control of the 
line supervisors on the shop floor, as discussed below. 
 
9The popularity of diaomao identity is also documented by journalist Liu Zhiyi (2010). After working in D city 
Slovcoon for 28 days, he noted that “they call others ‘diaomao’, even though they don’t know each other.” “In the 
workplace and the dormitory, diaomao is the only personal pronoun except the first-person pronouns.” 
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Offensive Language to Re-negotiate Inequality  
      The diaomao identity is demonstrated through the use of offensive language as a means of 
defending dignity and regaining masculinity. Every day on the production line, angry men 
workers are quarreling with their frontline supervisors. When the workers are reprimanded for 
minor mistakes, they use offensive language with their frontline supervisors. For example, after a 
line supervisor disciplined several men workers by having them stand for 30 minutes as 
punishment for their inability to meet quotas, they yelled: “The line supervisor should have his 
ass kicked! That scum!” The men workers use such language to express their frustrations 
towards the excessive control in the workplace (Jay and Janschewitz 2008).  
A man worker called Li stated that the diaomao mindset is not just peacocking, but also a 
necessary personality change. 
Slovcoon’s corporate culture… turns good people into bad people. In high school and 
college, we were polite to our classmates and teachers. We didn’t swear nor did we 
want to…but here, you can’t survive without doing that.  
      There are many cases where workers confessed to using threatening language with lower 
management because it implies that they are associated with gangs. By using such threatening 
language, these men workers hoped that line supervisors would hesitate to discipline them.  
I was late once, and he [supervisor] pointed his finger at me, so I knocked him down. He 
said: ‘As soon as I saw you, I knew that you’re in a gang’…Then he transferred me and 
afterwards, I threatened him…told him I’ll wait for him after work… [now] everyone is 
afraid to annoy me because they know I’m short-tempered. (Man Worker) 
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The use of offensive language to counter management means that the men workers 
constantly take on roles other than that of the worker-supervisor as defined by the hierarchical 
ranking at the factory, such as with the use of gender and class, to discredit the authority of the 
line supervisors.  
The use of gender to renegotiate status and power is most obvious when the men workers 
clash with women line supervisors.  
Our line supervisor…yelled at us… she said we are useless…we are scum, rubbish! 
Being yelled at by a woman is humiliating. Everyone…hates her. I’m not the only 
one…everyone…wants to beat her up. But we’re men, so we can’t hit a woman. (Man 
Worker) 
This man worker used traditional gender discourse to express his frustrations: men do not fight 
with women because they are weaker, so he does not try to hit his woman supervisor. Moreover, 
despite the fact he was angry with her, he renegotiated a higher status by drawing on the existing 
gender discourse. This is similar to Purser’s (2009) finding that Latino immigrant day laborers 
make sense of their work and find dignity in their quest for work by invoking gender discourses.  
      While gender roles are activated to address women supervisors, the most commonly used 
discourse to deal with any supervisor is social class. When a man worker was asked by his 
supervisor: “What on earth are you doing? You want to keep your job or not?”, he replied:  
Whether I get to keep my job is not up to you. If it is, if you’re that tough, then fire me 
now. But you don’t have the right to fire me…you’re just a line supervisor…under 
the…group supervisors. 
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This greatly angered his supervisor who said: “So what? Line supervisor is still higher than you. 
You’re just a low-level frontline worker…just a dagongzai [working man].” To which he replied: 
“So aren’t you just a dagongmei?” 
 Line supervisors are in the same social class as the workers; many were promoted from the 
assembly line, and their wages are only slightly higher than those of the workers, despite the fact 
that they are somewhat higher on the factory hierarchy. The use of class as retaliation is also very 
common with the men supervisors. When the workers were reprimanded by men line supervisors, 
they would often say: “Why is he so cocky?! He is just here to dagong [work], just like us.” 
Sometimes they also call the male management staff “useless diaomao” in private, attempting to 
equate themselves with management by emphasizing a common class status. 
      Thus, while Slovcoon compels its workers to accept the power inequality defined by their 
assigned formal roles, the men workers actively make their own roles to resist authority. To do 
so, they use offensive language and evoke other social discourses, such as those of gender and 
class, that were originally suppressed by the organizational hierarchical ranking. 
 
Claiming Superiority in Front of Women workers 
The men also construct their diaomao identity through flirting. Even though their 
masculinities have been constantly challenged and they are considered less desirable workers, 
flirting gives them the opportunity to rebuild their maleness and regain their status.  
The following exemplifies how the men workers flirt with the women. 
Male: “Give me one!”  
Female: “What?”  
Male: “Your sweet kiss!” 
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     The flirtation is overtly male-dominated because the men initiate and unequivocally control 
the flirtation. It is generally unacceptable for women to make sexual jokes and the flirtation 
situates women as objects for the men’s eyes to desire. Thus, through language and flirting, the 
men workers claim the work place as a masculine territory.  
In some cases, the flirting turns into aggressive sexual harassment such as touching the body 
of their women co-workers, and using sexually explicit language. In contrast to Salzinger’s study 
(1997) where flirting is the primary entertainment for both young women and men at the plant, 
most of the women in this case are annoyed or insulted by the flirting and sexual harassment. A 
woman worker said: “I think that the most troublesome thing is the guys who tell dirty jokes to 
us. Some of them are so dirty that I can’t even repeat them.” Some men even brag about their 
experiences with prostitutes in front of the women workers.  
While the majority of women complain about flirting and sexual harassment, the men 
workers downplay the issue:  
Yeah, there are [sexual jokes and touching]. But we don’t think that’s sexual harassment. 
Sometimes we talk about dirty stuff during work. Some of the women can’t stand it, so they 
say nothing. Others are more open-minded, and they play along with us.  
Flirting and sexual harassment constitute relaxation and fun on the assembly line for men, and 
divert their attention from the alienation of production work. Moreover, as their masculinity has 
been constantly challenged during work, flirting and sexual harassment are used as 
compensatory manhood acts that allow them to rebuild their maleness. In this context, sexual 
harassment is also the process that distinguishes “real men” from “teenage boys.” For instance, 
when several senior men workers talked about dirty jokes, they said to a 17 year-old man worker: 
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“Hey, boy. Do not listen to this. Our conversation is not for kids.”10 By preventing teenage boys 
from employing obscene language, these adult men workers further identify themselves as 
sexually active and mature men.  
Men workers also expressed masculinities by engaging in sexual experiences, such as one-
night-stands, and then bragging about them in front of other men workers. For example, a 21 
year-old man said: “my shortest relationship [girlfriend] lasted 7 days, and the longest 3 months. 
If they [girlfriends] got pregnant, they got abortions. I signed for at least two abortions.” To other 
men workers, these sexual trysts paint them as “attractive men (men who are attractive to women, 
and thus perceived as more masculine).” When the men cannot accommodate gender stereotypes 
(Bird 2003), such as earning a family wage, they exaggerate their sexuality as a way to defend 
their deprived masculinity.  
If a sexually harassed woman worker complains to the managers, it is to no avail because 
most of the men managers consider sexual harassment a “natural” expression of manhood. In 
fact, men managers also actively participated in the flirtation and sexual harassment. When Hong 
reported her experience with sexual harassment to her man group supervisor, he replied: “It’s 
nothing. It’s a joke. They’re [men workers] just being young. Don’t be so old-fashioned, okay?” 
Bing, another woman worker, also had a similar experience: “…I asked my supervisor to make 
the men stop telling dirty jokes…But…my supervisor said: ‘Why are other women fine with it, 
but you can’t cope? …You are a woman. If you can’t…it might be difficult for you to have 
normal social interactions [with men].’”   
As shown above, both men managers and workers often use conventional gender discourses 
to justify sexual harassment and gain superiority over women workers. In so doing, they also 
10Analysis of the Survey indicates that about 18.2% of the workers are between the age of 16 and 18.  
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perpetuate the male-dominated gender relations on the shop floor. On the one hand, men 
management staff secure the support of most of the men workers by tolerating the sexual 
harassment, and to some extent, this also guarantees the production orders. On the other hand, by 
actively engaging in flirting and sexual harassment, the men workers explicitly reject their low 
status, and silently forge an alliance with men managers. Nevertheless, this alliance is based on 
the “double exploitation” of women workers. Women who work on the assembly line not only 
suffer the exploitation of the extraction of their surplus labor by the capitalists, but also endure 
the objectification of their sexuality and body by men. 
In such a work environment, many of the women workers are depressed. They try to protect 
themselves and retaliate by eliminating feminine attributes like gentleness. Some exhibit 
rebellious, aggressive behavior and become defensive, retaliating against the sexual harassment 
by fighting back or using dirty language to curse others. When this happened, however, both the 
men and some of the other women on the assembly line often remind them to “behave like a 
woman.” By disciplining women workers’ language and actions, the men reiterate their 
superiority over women and make the workplace a male-dominated space.  
 
Fight for a Better Future 
In addition to the use of offensive language and sexual harassment, to be diaomao means 
readiness to leave the job when challenged to a certain point, usually in an abrupt and violent 
manner. As a demonstration of the worker’s resolve to leave, one of the most frequent 
expressions heard in the factory was “Fuck it, I quit!” because, for the men workers, defending 
dignity is even more important than the job itself.  
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 The men workers are well aware that their wages are not enough to support a family or meet 
the social expectations of being a husband, son, or father. Almost all believe that the work at 
Slovcoon is temporary. Their plan was to seek better paying jobs afterwards.  
I don’t plan to work here long. I have a relative who works on a construction site; I 
could work with him. (Man Worker) 
This sentiment is shared by more than 90% of men workers. While some would consider a job as 
a construction worker with a better salary, others have made plans to start a small business. 
Being a temporary job, they do not hesitate to leave when a better opportunity arises or if the 
work situation becomes intolerable. Moreover, since the work cannot provide the men workers 
with a family wage, they feel that they have little to lose.  
  This type of distancing from the current job by framing it as only temporary is in line 
with the strategies used by men in the West who work those jobs normally reserved for 
women (Williams 1995; Martin 2003); however, in the Chinese case, it is not just framing, 
but an action that many eventually take. Indeed, the turnover rate is very high. For instance, 
in February 2011, Slovcoon recruited more than 5,000 frontline workers, but in July 2011, 
only about 2,000 remained. The Survey showed that over half have worked in Slovcoon for 
less than six months.  
Interestingly, for many men workers, the diaomao identity characterizes even the process of 
resignation. The resignations often involve physical violence towards management staff. For 
example, a worker who was not happy with the line supervisor and wanted to leave the company 
sought the opportunity to be terminated. He walked over to a surveillance camera, and called for 
his supervisor. After his supervisor arrived, the worker slapped him. Physical fighting is strictly 
prohibited at Slovcoon, and regardless of the reason, anyone involved in a fight will be 
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terminated. Thus, since both the worker and the supervisor would be fired, the worker took 
revenge on his line supervisor by causing the loss of his job. In fact, it is not uncommon for the 
men workers to physically assault management staff before they leave their job or afterwards. 
There are even urban legends at Slovcoon that management staff are assaulted outside the factory. 
In these situations, men workers who resort to violence are not viewed as thugs but brave, 
righteous men who take a stance against coercive management. In some cases, worker’s feelings 
of discontent and anger have even turned into collective violence towards management, as in the 
case of the riot in Taiyuan Slovcoon in 2012. The riot was sparked when several security guards 
struck a man worker who failed to show his staff card when entering a dormitory, and it quickly 
escalated into an unrest in which about 2,000 workers fought with security guards, destroyed 
several security posts, smashed shuttle buses and a staff canteen, and pushed over the factory 
gate. 
      These men workers are willing to engage in violent and disruptive episodes when they leave 
their job because a job that cannot provide them with a family wage is, by principle, only 
temporary. Physical violence becomes the last resort used to retain dignity and status in the 
hegemonic hierarchy at work, and to rescue their deprived masculinities. Consequently, this 
resistance disrupts production efficiency and in fact, the high turnovers affect the production and 
output of the whole line. Ultimately, the line supervisors also suffer the consequences because 
they assume the responsibility and their wages are reduced when performance quotas are not met.  
        It is worth re-emphasizing that the rebellious working-class masculine diaomao identity is 
acquired and gradually developed on the shop floor of Slovcoon. When new men workers enter 
Slovcoon, they are automatically called “diaomao” by other men workers whether they like it or 
not. After working in the factory for a while (ranging from a few days to a couple of weeks), the 
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new workers quickly learn how to engage in confrontational practices, such as using offensive 
language, in response to the strict labor control and despotic management. They also begin to 
address both themselves and other men workers as “diaomao.” Compared to the newcomers, the 
senior workers are more experienced in articulating their diaomao identity to defend their rights 
and dignity. They are usually the key players who socialize newcomers into diaomao identity, 
initiate flirting, and resort to offensive language and sometimes physical violence to retaliate 
against coercive management. This identity is made and remade during the interactions between 
management and workers, as well as men and women on the production line.  
      Despite the resistance strategies, many of the workers feel hopeless and alienated after 
working in the factory for a period of time, and sometimes this even affects their self-esteem. A 
young man worker said: “I am useless, going to work like a robot every day, make products that 
I could never afford to buy. I am losing everything here: hope, time and my youth.” Another 
young man worker explained why he left his job: “I have absolutely no freedom here, especially 
no freedom of thought.” The accounts of the workers indicate that despite their confrontational 
behavior, they still feel powerless and hopeless, and they lack self-esteem due to the shop floor’s 
structural constraints.  
 
Conclusion  
        Capitalism, in its highly exploitative form in China, has undermined working-class 
masculinity. In response, men workers have developed a diaomao identity, characterized by 
confrontational behavior through the use of offensive language, flirting and sexual harassment, 
as well as physical violence, to re-negotiate the power order on the shop floor. By drawing on 
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discourses that have been suppressed by the formal hierarchy in the organization, such as gender 
and class, they challenge the authority of their superiors, reclaim their superiority over women in 
the factory, and consequently defend their deprived masculinities. In so doing, they have caused 
production instability and volatility on the assembly line.  
Men employed in traditionally female-dominated occupations in the West are more likely 
to enjoy higher wages and increased opportunities for promotion because of the so-called “glass 
escalator” phenomenon (Floge and Merrill 1986; Heikes 1991). However, Chinese men workers 
at the Slovcoon factory have no such privileges. As discussed above, most of the strategies 
adopted by men in the Western contexts, such as focusing on the masculine aspects of the job or 
seeking possibilities of upward mobility, are not available to Chinese workers. Moreover, the 
Chinese workers have to face despotic management in the form of verbal and physical 
punishment, which is usually lacking in other workplaces that have been examined by existing 
literature. The origin of this difference between Western versus Chinese contexts is the highly 
exploitative global capitalism met with the local Chinese societies’ eagerness to participate in the 
global economy. This cooperation between the global capitalists and local Chinese states is 
conducted in a way that strictly controls and exploits the Chinese workers.  
 Consequently, these men workers mostly rely on interpersonal interactions to restore their 
deprived masculinity, as they have little else to use to resist inequality and coercive control. 
Since the main source of their oppression is direct daily control by the managerial staff, their 
main form of resistance or compensatory manhood acts are interactional. The workers respond to 
the highly controlled and oppressive organizational arrangements by using abusive language, 
flirting, and engaging in physical violence. But these seemingly radical resistances are strategies 
to overcome their material and symbolic deprivation. In so doing, gender identity is contested, 
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reconstructed or displaced through interpersonal interactions by using available resources in a 
given context (Connell 1995). 
 Although the agency and resistance of the men workers are emphasized here, it is 
important to keep in mind that they are still in oppressed positions in the global factory. Without 
legal protection and institutional support, the extent to which they can negotiate their power and 
status is very limited. In fact, many do not have basic labor rights. For example, self-termination, 
the ultimate step the workers can take to fight back, causes disruption on the production line, but 
the workers themselves are usually not able to get part of their wages by resigning.  
Along this line of research, future work can be done on how the changing labor conditions 
in China influence how workers understand masculinity. For example, will the prolonged 
experience of factory life eventually change their understanding of hegemonic masculinity 
discourses? If they continue to be the victims of this discourse that is supposed to provide higher 
status and more power over women, what are the implications for the sustainability of global 
factories? Investigations to answer these questions will help provide a better understanding on 
the complex and multifaceted relationship between global capitalism, local labor processes, and 
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